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Accelerated technological change plays a crucial role in enabling the low-carbon energy transition.
Quantitative energy modelling exploring alternative long-term decarbonisation pathways can support
policy-makers in choosing the most important areas for technology promotion. This study analyses the
potential contribution of marine energy in the UK from an energy systems perspective considering the
trade-offs between local lead markets and global learning, the uncertainty in the learning potential,
competition with alternative technologies and impacts on system balancing. The results indicate that
only under very favourable conditions, i.e. with learning rates above 15% and high global deployment,
marine energy will have a signiﬁcant contribution to the UK decarbonisation pathway. Alternatively,
marine energy could constitute a hedging strategy against multiple failure in other low-carbon options.
The early strategic investments into marine energy lead, in most cases, to a slight rise in societal welfare
costs compared to the respective cases without attempts to induce marine learning and brings beneﬁts to
the electricity system. Thus, on the whole, we conclude that marine energy has the potential to
contribute to the UK energy system, but there is a substantial risk that strategic investments in a national
lead market will not directly pay off in the long term.
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The recent Paris agreement [79] has put further emphasis on the
substantial decarbonisation challenge that nations will face in the
coming decades. To enable such deep emission cuts, accelerated
technological change will be required, as most low-carbon tech-
nologies still have the potential for considerable cost reductions
[12]. Governments can play an important role in spurring techno-
logical innovations by implementing measures of technology pro-
motion that go beyond the standard instruments of climate policy
like emission taxes or trading systems. Such additional support for
sustainable technologies is justiﬁed by the simultaneous occur-
rence of two market failures e environmental externalities as well
as knowledge and other externalities in the innovation system [35].
The question then remains, however, what government interven-
tion in innovation systems should look like ewhether only general
support to promote a strong national innovation system or explicit
support for the development, demonstration and diffusion ofLondon, WC1H 0NN, United
er).
er Ltd. This is an open access articspeciﬁc technologies should be provided [27,51]. A look at the
current climate and energy policy landscape in Europe reveals that
governments strongly intervene in innovation systems and use
both technology-push and demand-pull mechanisms to promote
low-carbon technologies [18,63]. When deciding on the right areas
and measures for technology promotion, governments also have to
take national vs. global trade-offs into account [54]. In most cases,
learning in energy technologies takes place in global markets and
national energy systems can beneﬁt from spill-overs [42]. At the
same time, the national framework conditions (the innovation
system, natural conditions, regulations, etc.) play a crucial role in
the adoption and diffusion of new technologies. Moreover, the
possibility for national niche markets and potential economic
beneﬁts from ﬁrst-mover advantages have to be taken into account,
as has been the case for the wind industry in Denmark, Germany
and the Netherlands. [46,86]. In addition, with the need for a rapid
low-carbon transition of the energy system becoming ever more
urgent, technologies need to reach commercial availability soon.
Here, a statement from the UK's Carbon Plan [16], deﬁning the long-
term national decarbonisation strategy, is striking: “In the 2020s, we
will run a technology race, with the least-cost technologies winning
the largest market share. Before then, our aim is to help a range of
technologies bring down their costs so they are ready to compete whenle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Marine technologies could represent an important part of a low
carbon energy system [37]. The UK is currently in an advantageous
position to establish a national lead market for marine (wave and
tidal) energy technologies having favourable natural conditions [9].
Globally, the UK is leading in terms of planned ocean power pro-
jects and number of major industry players as can be seen in Fig. 1.
Additionally, the UK has several world class sea testing facilities and
beneﬁts from a variety of public fundingmechanisms, including the
Offshore Renewable Energy Catapult and a strike price between
300 and 310£/MWh for wave energy and 295e300£/MWh for tidal
energy for 2021/22 and 2022/23 respectively, under the Second
Contract for Difference (CdF) Allocation Round taking place in April
2017 [20]. For further information on the development landscape
for marine energy in the UK, see Refs. [22,38,44]. At the same time,
marine technologies are still at an early stage of development and
lagging behind other more established renewable energy technol-
ogies. Thus, further government support would be needed to arrive
at a dominant technology design (especially for wave), implement
full scale testing, perform environmental assessments, develop and
optimise methods for installation, operation&maintenance as well
as grid connection and, above all, to drive down costs [22,44].
In the analysis at hand we develop an exogenous learning
approach for marine technologies in a national energy system,
paying special attention to global vs. local trade-offs and uncertainty.
We analyse the interplay between strategic investments into a
national lead-market in the medium-term and spill-overs from
global technological change in the long-term and apply a sensitivity
analysis on key learning parameters. Furthermore, the contribution
of marine technologies in the case of failure of other low-carbon
electricity options is explored. With this approach we address the
question under which conditions marine energy could be expected
to have a signiﬁcant contribution to the UK decarbonisation
pathway and whether an early UK action could be justiﬁed as cost
effective for the UK, if it then triggered further global deployment,
and learning, later on.
Quantitative energy modelling has long played a key role at the
science-policy interface by mapping out possible decarbonisation
strategies and relaying these insights to policy-makers [78].
Bottom-up, cost optimizing whole energy system models are
applied to determine cost-efﬁcient and consistent long-term
pathways for a low-carbon energy transition and to analyse in-
teractions and the competition between technologies as well as
low-carbon energy vectors in the system. Given the complexity of
innovation and learning processes, most energy system analyses
make exogenous assumptions on the rate of technological change
[67]. Also, in system analyses for small open economies it is usuallyFig. 1. Key market ﬁgures for marine treasonable to assume at least part of the learning process as
exogenous and taking place on the global scale. Endogenous ap-
proaches usually focus on learning-by-doing potentials, where in-
vestments costs (or other technology parameters) improve as a
function of the cumulative installed capacity according to a speci-
ﬁed learning rate, so-called one-factor learning curves [8]. A variety
of aspects of the learning process have been analysed with energy
systems models including component learning [1,58,82], the
impact of technology clusters [19,43,75], regional spill-overs
[6,31,54,72], the effect of R&D expenditures through two-factor
learning curves [7,47,55,56,83] as well as learning under uncer-
tainty [28,73]. Concerning marine energy technologies a number of
studies have reviewed the current technology designs [5,26,48],
performed economic assessments [2,4,14,40], analysed the learning
potential and prospects of marine technologies [21,52], and
assessed key investment barriers [45,50,57]. There are only two
studies which look at marine learning from an energy systems
perspective [37]. have performed a ﬁrst assessment of marine en-
ergy in the UK with a systems approach setting up scenarios with
combinations of learning for different technologies. Their analysis
does not investigate the impacts of alternative learning rates or
differentiate between local and global learning, nor does it analyse
the impacts technology failures for other key technologies might
have on the prospects of marine. Sgobbi et al. [87] assess the effects
of decreasing costs due to global technology learning and of efﬁ-
ciency improvements for marine technologies on their deployment
in the EU. This study does not analyse local learning or assess how
marine deployment may depend on the success or failure of other
technologies.
The cost-effective deployment of marine technologies depends
on the respective learning on the national and global level as well as
on the developments in other technologies. Our literature review
highlights that no previous study has systematically explored how
the interplay between changing key marine learning parameters,
both nationally and globally, and the failure and success of
competing technologies affects the modelled deployment of ma-
rine energy. We close this gap by using a long term energy systems
model to assess 80 different scenarios with varying parameters on
national and global marine learning, technology availability of low
carbon electricity options and also technology spill-overs between
marine and offshore wind. This allows us to determine the condi-
tions under which marine energy can, in our model, become part of
the energy system. In addition, we soft-link UKTM to a high spatial
and temporal resolution electricity system model to assess one
other aspect of the potential system beneﬁts offered by marine
power. In addition to providing information about the possible
required thresholds for marine technology breakthrough, thisechnologies in 2014 (Source [64]).
1 Tidal barrages are modelled separately in UKTM, but are not included in the
learning approach as they constitute a very different technology compared to wave
and tidal stream [33].
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learning in long term decarbonisation strategies.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section
focuses on the methodology, providing a short overview on the
whole energy systems model and the approach for the learning
sensitivity analysis. In the third section, the results of the analysis
are presented, including the additional analysis on electricity sys-
tem impacts. The implications on the beneﬁts and costs of devel-
oping a national lead market for marine technologies in the UK are
further discussed in section 4. The paper concludes which a short
discussion of future research needs.
2. Methodological approach
2.1. Economic evaluation from a whole energy systems perspective
2.1.1. The national energy system model UKTM
For the system analysis of learning in marine technologies the
new national UK TIMES energy system model (UKTM) is employed
[15,23,24]. UKTM has been developed at the UCL Energy Institute
over the last two years as a successor to the UK MARKAL model
[88]. It is based on the model generator TIMES (The Integrated
MARKAL-EFOM System), which is developed and maintained by
the Energy Technology Systems Analysis Programme (ETSAP) of the
International Energy Agency (IEA) [49].
UKTM is a technology-oriented, dynamic, linear programming
optimisation model representing the entire UK energy system from
imports and domestic production of fuel resources, through fuel
processing and supply, explicit representation of infrastructures,
conversion to secondary energy carriers (including electricity, heat
and hydrogen), end-use technologies and energy service demands.
Generally, it minimizes the total welfare costs (under perfect
foresight) to meet the exogenously given, but price elastic, sectoral
energy demands under a range of input assumptions and additional
constraints, thereby delivering a cost optimal, system-wide solu-
tion for the energy transition for the coming decades.
A key strength of UKTM is that it represents the whole UK en-
ergy system under a given decarbonisation objective, which means
that trade-offs between mitigation efforts in one sector versus
another can be explored. The model is divided into three supply
side sectors (resources & trade, processing & infrastructure and
electricity generation) and ﬁve demand sectors (residential, ser-
vices, industry, transport and agriculture). All sectors are calibrated
to the base year 2010, for which the existing stock of energy
technologies and their characteristics are known and taken into
account. A large variety of future supply and demand technologies
are represented by techno-economic parameters such as the ca-
pacity factor, energy efﬁciency, lifetime, capital costs, O&M costs
etc. Assumptions are also exogenously provided for attributes not
directly connected to individual technologies, such as fuel import
prices, resource availability and the potentials of renewable energy
sources. UKTM has a time resolution of 16 time-slices (four seasons
and four intra-day times-slices). In addition to all energy ﬂows,
UKTM tracks CO2, CH4, N2O and HFC emissions. For more infor-
mation on UKTM see Ref. [25].
In addition to its academic use, UKTM is the central long-term
energy system pathway model used for policy analysis at the
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and the Com-
mittee on Climate Change (CCC).
2.1.2. Methodology for the sensitivity analysis around technology
learning
UKTM explicitly models, in a system context, the competition
between different technologies that provide the same fuel or en-
ergy services. Here, this approach is used to explore the potentialsof marine technologies to contribute to the decarbonisation of the
UK energy system and the potential beneﬁts and costs from the
strategic development of a national market for wave and tidal
technologies in the UK. Special attention is paid to potential
learning-by-doing effects and the interplay between national and
global technology development. The following framework for ma-
rine technologies is set up: based on its current position in the
marine market, it is assumed that the UK undertakes, with the help
of targeted government support, a strategic development of the
national marine energy market and establishes itself as the market
leader by 2030. In this time, learning effects depend solely on the
national cumulative capacity instalments, reﬂecting the niche
market development taking place in the UK. After 2030, the global
deployment of marine technologies is expected to pick up such that
further learning occurs fully on the global market. Further, marine
technologies no longer receive any preferential treatment in the
UK.
This storyline is then implemented in UKTM in the following
manner (see Fig. 2). Given the current uncertainties around the
technology design that will prevail in the long term, marine tech-
nologies e representing both tidal stream and wave power e are
modelled by one process in UKTM.1 The initial capital costs of 6000
£/kW are based on [22]. The resource potential is adopted from
Carbon Trust (2011), resulting in a maximum capacity for wave and
tidal stream technologies of 24.5 GW in the UK. The strategic na-
tional market development between 2020 and 2030 is reﬂected in
the model by forcing in a trajectory for installed capacity of this
marine technology, reaching 0.5 GW in 2020 and 4 GW in 2030
(based on projections from Ref. [69]. Assessing learning-by-doing
for technologies that are not yet fully commercial is challenging
(see e.g. Refs. [71,74] for fuel cells). So far, little investments in
marine have occurred in the UK and with lead times of 3e5 years
the expansion and early stage cost reductions that can be expected
to take place until 2020 are limited. We therefore parametrize the
learning-by-doing process to start in 2020, with an initial capacity
of 0.5 GW and an initial investment cost of 6000 £/kW (based on
[22,52]). All learning effects are calculated outside of the model -
assuming that each doubling of cumulative capacity additions leads
to a reduction in the speciﬁc investment costs determined by the
learning rate - and the resulting cost trajectory is then fed into the
model. Hence, in the period from 2020 to 2030, the assumed
learning rate (see below) is applied to the national cumulative ca-
pacity additions. After 2030, no further national investments are
forced into the model, such that marine technologies are in direct
competitionwith the other low-carbon electricity options in UKTM
and the model chooses the cost optimal investments for fulﬁlling
the energy demands. In addition, from 2030 onwards the learning
effects are based on the expected global cumulative deployment of
marine technologies and assuming that the UK beneﬁts from full
regional spill-overs (i.e. technology costs are determined also for
the UK based on the global cumulative deployment of the
technology).
Starting from this basic approach, a sensitivity analysis is then
conducted on key developments that affect the competitiveness of
marine technologies in the UK (Table 1). The learning rates for
marine technologies, that are both applied to the national learning
between 2020 and 2030 and to the global learning afterwards, are
varied between 5 and 20%, based on what has been observed for
other electricity technologies in the past [41,60,77] and what is
generally expected for marine technologies [4,9,36]. Apart from the
Fig. 2. Graphic representation of the basic modelling approach with the standard learning by doing equations with.
Table 1
Overview on parameters varied in the sensitivity analysis.
Learning rate 5%, 10%, 15%, 20% (both national and global)
Global deployment after
2030
- High: 178 GW in 2050 (based on 2 scenario in ETP (2015))
- Low: 37 GW in 2050 (based on 6 scenario in ETP (2015))
Failure in other
technologies
- NO CCS (CCS does not become available in the UK)
- Low NUC (total nuclear capacity is restricted to 16 GW)
- Low RE (installed capacity restricted to 16 GW for offshore wind and 10 GW for solar PV)
- Combined (all of the failures combined)
Learning spill- overs
(yes/no)
Partial spill- over from installed offshore wind capacity: Conservative learning rate of 7%, learning in 20% of total capital costs (installation and
connection) and 50% of O&M costs
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will strongly affect their competitiveness in the UK in the long-
term, since national capacity investments alone are unlikely to
induce sufﬁcient cost reductions. In the present sensitivity analysis,
a high and a low trajectory are contrasted, both taken from the IEA's
Energy Technology Perspectives 2015 [32] with a gradual increase of
global marine capacity to 37 GW (business-as-usual/6 C Scenario)
or 178 GW (2 C Scenario) until 2050. Furthermore, the contribu-
tion of marine technologies in the case of failure of other low-
carbon electricity options is explored with four different cases in
addition to the scenarios with the standard UKTM assumptions on
technology availability: (1) CCS technologies do not become
commercially available in the UK before 2050 (case “No CCS”); (2)
nuclear capacity is restricted to 16 GW, i.e. only a moderate increase
over the currently installed 11 GW, while the reference case as-
sumes a nuclear potential of 33 GW in line with [16] (case “Low
NUC”); (3) the extension of key renewable electricity options is
restrictedwith an installed capacity of 16 GW in the case of offshore
wind (based on current projects with planning permission [70])
and 10 GW for solar PV [59], while in the reference case consider-
ably higher technical potentials are assumed (case “Low RE”); (4) a
combination of the technology failures in cases 1e3 (case“Combined”). Finally, the potential for learning spill-overs (SO)
from the national offshore wind capacity are taken into account.
Given the shared environment, marine and offshore wind face
similar challenges, especially in terms of installation and grid
connection as well as operation and maintenance. Thus, the po-
tential for partial spill-overs from the national cumulative offshore
wind capacity is incorporated assuming that the part of the in-
vestment cost of marine technologies that are associated to
installation and grid connection (assumed to be 20% based on [44]
can beneﬁt from increasing national offshore wind capacity. Also,
50% of the operation and maintenance costs can beneﬁt from these
partial learning spill-overs to reﬂect the shared environment. The
spill-over effects are added to themodel in an iterativemanner: in a
ﬁrst run without SO, the cumulative national offshore wind ca-
pacity is calculated. Afterwards, the cost trajectory for marine
technologies is adjusted in accordance with these partial SO. The
model is run again to assess whether this has inﬂuenced the
offshore wind capacity (and therefore the SO effects). The cost
trajectory for marine technology is adjusted accordingly until the
offshore wind capacity does not change from one run to the next.
In the sensitivity analysis, all possible parameter combinations
are explored resulting in 80 scenarios in total (4 learning rate cases
Fig. 3. Development of electricity supply by fuel type in the UK in the reference case.
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spill-over cases).
Apart from the assumptions for the sensitivity analysis
described in Table 1 standard input parameters of UKTM are used in
the scenario analysis. The demand drivers are based on standard
socio-economic assumptions, most importantly an average GDP
growth rate of 2.4% p.a [62]. and a rise in population of 0.5% p.a [65].
over the period from 2010 to 2050. For all other electricity tech-
nologies, exogenous learning rates are applied, assuming that the
UK is a price taker for globally developing technologies. These cost
trajectories are adopted from the Dynamic Dispatch Model (DDM)
[17].2 All scenarios take the UK legislation on GHG emission limits
into account, comprising the four ﬁve-yearly carbon budgets that
have been ﬁxed so far until 2027 [10] and the long-term target of
a 80% reduction until 2050 compared to 1990 [29]. To give the
model ﬂexibility with respect to the timing of emission reductions
after the four carbon budgets, the long-term target is applied via a
cumulative budget constraint covering the period from 2028 to
2050 which results in the same total quantity of emission reduction
as would a linear reduction pathway to 80% until 2050.
3. Results
3.1. The impact of learning in marine technologies on the energy
system
This section provides an overview on the results of the learning
sensitivity analysis in UKTM focusing on the possible contribution
of marine technologies to the UKTM energy system and on the cost
implications of the strategic development of a national niche
market for marine technologies.
3.1.1. The reference case
With the aim to establish a point of reference for the sensitivity
analysis on learning in marine technologies, we ﬁrst brieﬂy present
results on a reference case which has the same basic UKTM as-
sumptions as the sensitivity runs, but does not include any learning
on marine electricity technologies. Thus, this case indicates how
the transition to a low-carbon electricity system in the UK could
look like if no further development of the marine sector would take
place (Fig. 3). As expected, the use of fossil fuels is strongly reduced,
with a phase-out of coal until 2030 and a reduction of the contri-
bution of natural gas to less than 20% (almost entirely with CCS).
Based on the cost assumptions in the model, electricity generation
in the UK would be heavily dominated by nuclear energy, the
expansion of which in the model follows the imposed growth
constraints. By 2050, the overall capacity limit of 33 GW is reached
resulting in a contribution of about 50% to total generation. From
2030 onwards, the use of CCS is extended to biomass plants due to
the potential to generate negative emissions and thereby reducing
the pressure on the end-use sectors to contribute to emission
abatement. Accordingly, the electricity system becomes zero-
carbon in 2030 and delivers up to 50 Mt CO2eq of negative emis-
sions per year afterwards. Given the strong focus on large-scale
technologies like nuclear and CCS, the expansion of renewable
electricity generation is less strong with a share of wind energy in
total electricity generation of 15% in 2050.
In terms of electricity demand, the initial reduction until 2030
can be explained by a rising use of efﬁcient appliances in the
buildings sector (most importantly for lighting) and an absolute2 The actual cost ﬁgures of the DDM version underlying UKTM have not been
published. However, the resulting levelized costs of electricity are presented in
Fig. 4.decline in the electricity use in the industry sector mostly in line
with the falling production levels in energy-intensive branches.
Afterwards, an increased trend to electriﬁcation can be observed
mostly due to a strong expansion of heat pumps in residential
heating and a rising contribution of electric cars to road transport
demand.
It has to be noted that these results are driven by the highly
uncertain cost trajectories assumed in UKTM. In particular, signif-
icant uncertainties exist around the future of nuclear energy in the
UK and the commercial availability of CCS technologies. As a less
optimistic trajectory for either of the two would correspondingly
enhance the prospects of the other, competing technologies, we
will further explore different cases of technology failure in the
sensitivity analysis (see also [24] for an extended analysis of tech-
nology failures).
To highlight the current situation of marine energy in the UK
system, Fig. 4 presents the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for
key generation technologies in the reference case. The rising carbon
price leads to increases in the LCOE of fossil fuel technologies, even
with CCS. Accordingly, a huge drop in costs occurs for bio CCS plants
until 2035. Afterwards, the growing competition puts pressure on
prices for bioenergy resources such that the LCOE for bioenergy
technologies rise again signiﬁcantly. Both for onshore and offshore
wind farms, relatively moderate learning effects are expected such
that the LCOE reach 84 £/MWh and 101 £/MWh by 2050. Based on
the DDM cost assumptions, nuclear power plants exhibit with 65
£/MWh the lowest generation costs in 2050.
This emphasizes the challenge that marine technologies
currently face in the UK energy system. With capital costs of 6000
£/kW, operating and maintenance cost at 3% of capital costs and a
capacity factor of 31%, the marine technology modelled in UKTM
starts with LCOE of 326 £/MW. Thus, to reach competitiveness with
other generation types, this cost would have to decrease to lessFig. 4. Development of LCOE of key technologies in the reference case.
Table 2
Marine capacity installed in 2050 across the scenario matrix (with GD¼ global deployment, LR¼ learning rate, TF¼ technology failure, SO¼ learning spill-overs from offshore
wind).
Fig. 5. Comparison of electricity generation in 2050 in scenarios with high marine
learning (HL) and the respective reference scenarios (R, without marine learning) for
different cases of technology failure.
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third of today's cost. Under which conditions that could be the case
or which other factors might inﬂuence the role of marine tech-
nologies in the UK electricity system is explored through a sensi-
tivity analysis in the next section.
3.2. Sensitivity analysis e impacts on the electricity system
The sensitivity analysis explores the impact of four key param-
eters on the diffusion of marine technologies in the UK energy
system: the learning rate (LR), global deployment (GD), failure in
other key generation technologies (TF) and possible learning spill-
overs from offshore wind capacity (SO). As a ﬁrst step, the installed
marine capacity in 2050 across the 80 sensitivity runs is compared
(Table 2). In 2030, 4 GWof themarine technology are installed in all
scenarios as a result of the assumed strategic development of the
national market. Afterwards, however, the optimisation approach
of UKTM decides whether further marine capacity is installed.
The results of the sensitivity analysis in Table 2 show that the
assumed learning rate and the assumptions on technology failure
have the strongest impact on the long-term diffusion of marine
technologies. Learning rates of 5 or 10% are generally too low to
incentivise further investments such that the marine capacity,
assumed to have a lifetime of 20 years in the model, is even phased
out by 2050. With learning rates of 15% or 20%, the deployment in
the UK depends strongly on the global capacity which deﬁnes the
learning effects. A full exploitation of the assumed available marine
potential of 25 GW by 2050 only occurs with a learning rate of 20%
and the high global deployment trajectory (notwithstanding the
cases with multiple technology failure). Also, at a 15% learning rate
and without key technology failures, signiﬁcant investments
(>10 GW) are only realized in combination with high global ca-
pacity, while with low global deployment a learning rate of 20% is
needed to induce similar investment ﬁgures. Looking at the cases
with failure in other key generation technologies shows that
restricting the capacity of nuclear power or of other renewable
generation technologies generally has no impact on the diffusion of
marine technologies, as there are still cheaper options that could
replace themissing capacity. In contrast, the contribution of marine
energy is higher under the assumption that CCS does not become
commercially available with signiﬁcant investments already at alearning rate of 10% and high global deployment. This highlights
the importance of bio-CCS as a safety valve for the energy system. If
bio-CCS is not available, the electricity system is still fully decar-
bonized, but as there is no longer the option to produce negative
emissions, a stronger electriﬁcation of the end-use sectors also
takes place as their contribution to emission mitigation needs to
rise.
The case of a combined failure in nuclear, renewable and CCS
technologies puts extreme pressure on the decarbonisation of the
electricity system such that a strong contribution of marine tech-
nologies is required even at a low learning rate of 5%. Comparing
the scenarios with and without learning spill-overs from the na-
tional offshore wind capacity does not reveal any substantial dif-
ferences indicating that the here assumed spill-over effects are not
signiﬁcant enough to inﬂuence the competitiveness of marine
technologies.
Thus, the sensitivity analysis has shown that a signiﬁcant
contribution of marine energy to the UK energy system only occurs
in an environment of signiﬁcant learning (with rates of 15% or
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carbon generation options. Not all technology failures are equal,
however: Failure of CCS technology alone is able to induce marine
investments throughout to 2050, except if the learning rate is very
low. In light of the still uncertain future of CCS [89], marine could
possibly provide a hedging strategy against CCS failure (although as
we'll soon show, also for CCS failure a learning rate of at least 15% is
required before the early investments can be justiﬁed in terms of
costs).
To further explore what an energy systemwith high penetration
of marine energy would look like and what technologies it would
replace, the electricity generationmix for 2050 is presented in Fig. 5
comparing high marine scenarios (20% learning rate and high
global deployment) with the respective reference scenarios (no
learning in marine technologies) for different cases of technology
failure.
In general, marine technologies replace the next most expensive
technology according to the merit-order curve. In the case with no
assumed technology failure, this is the majority of offshore wind
generation and part of the natural gas CCS plants. Hence, the
renewable share in electricity generation in 2050 increases to 36%
in the high marine scenario compared to 26% in the respective
reference and the electricity sector contributes with an additional
6Mt CO2eq to emissionmitigation. Accordingly, the pressure on the
end-use sectors to reduce emissions is diminished, resulting in a
slightly lower electriﬁcation of demand. Similar trends can be
observed in the scenarios with limited availability of nuclear power
or renewable generation options. By contrast, in the cases without
CCS, marine energy replaces intermittent renewable generation,
both from offshore wind and solar photovoltaics. Also, total elec-
tricity demand is about 15% higher than in the cases without
technology failure, as here, without the option to generate negative
emissions through bio-CCS, the end-use sectors have to contribute
more strongly to emission abatement through electriﬁcation. In the
highly constrained scenario with the combination of technology
failures, electricity generation is reduced by roughly a quarter in
2050 compared to the case without technology failure and marine
energy is even deployed in the absence of learning effects. With
high learning rates, the marine contribution is almost doubled and
used mainly to increase electricity generation.
Hence, the analysis of the scenarios with the most favourable
conditions for marine energy shows that in 2050 the contribution
of marine technologies could reach the full potential assumed in
this scenario analysis for the UK of about 66 TWh covering between
12 and 17% of total electricity generation in the UK.Fig. 6. Development of LCOE for marine energy in the sensitivity analysis (coloured
areas show difference in LCOE with the same learning rate but with low or high global
deployment (HGD), values shown are without learning spill-overs from offshore wind
(SO) except of the red line). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)3.3. Cost
The analysis with UKTM has shown that, with strategic devel-
opment of a national lead market until 2030, marine energy could
achieve a signiﬁcant share in the UK electricity system by 2050, if
high learning rates and strong global deployment prevails. In this
section we will analyse what this would mean in terms of costs for
the energy system. Fig. 6 summarises the LCOE trajectories across
the range of learning rates and levels of global deployment.
Starting from 326 £/MWh in 2020, considerable cost reductions
are already realized during the establishment of the national
market where learning effects are assumed to depend on the na-
tionally installed capacity alone. In 2030, the LCOE range between
160 and 280 £/MWh. After that, the LCOE vary strongly according to
the imposed learning rate and global deployment trajectory
resulting in a considerable range from 50 to almost 240 £/MWh in
2050. As suggested by the comparison of future generation costs of
key technologies (see Fig. 4), signiﬁcant deployment of marine
energy only takes place if the LCOE falls below 100 £/MWh. The
threshold level is higher, if other low-carbon generation options
fail, as for example, without CCS, LCOE of 170 £/MWh are sufﬁcient
to induce some marine investments by 2050. In terms of capital
costs, LCOE of 50 £/MWh would correspond to around 900 £/kW,
well below the current level for onshore wind farms. As already
indicated by the results of the sensitivity analysis in Table 2, the
possibility of positive spill-over effects in learning from national
offshore wind capacity has only a marginal effect on the LCOE of
marine energy (shown in Fig. 6 by the difference between the red
line (LCOE with learning spill-overs) and the lower end of the dark
blue area (LCOEwith the same learning rate and global deployment
but without learning spill-overs)). Also, and as could be seen in
Table 2, it's clear that for LCOE the learning rate plays a much bigger
role than global deployment e having a higher learning rate, but
lower global deployment (nearly) always leads to a lower LCOE
value than a lower learning rate and higher global deployment
does.
In the next step, we assess whether the strategic investments
into a national lead market for marine energy technologies pays off
in the long-term by reaping the beneﬁts from global learning ef-
fects. The assumption is that in absence of UK's early efforts, global
learning never takes off and we will follow the reference scenario.
Conversely, any UK beneﬁts that are gained from the post-2030 cost
reductions in the learning scenarios are assumed to be direct
consequences of early UK action. Focusing on the energy system-
wide cost implications, we compare the cumulated discounted
welfare costs for the entiremodel horizon between the sensitivities
with learning and the respective reference cases without marine
learning but the same technology assumptions otherwise. Total
societal welfare costs are deﬁned as the net total surplus of pro-
ducers and consumers and comprise the entire costs of a speciﬁc
energy system, covering capital costs for energy conversion and
transport technologies, ﬁxed operating and maintenance costs as
well as fuel and certiﬁcate costs. It has to be noted that this
assessment covers the entire energy system, but does not include
wider macro-economic effects, like impacts on employment or
GDP.
The numbers in Table 3 show that in most cases, the early
strategic investments into marine energy lead to a rise in societal
welfare costs compared to the respective cases without a marine
push and the learning that follows. The cost increase is, however,
small with a maximum of 0.32% or £35 billion cumulated over the
entire model horizon. Yet, some exceptions need to be pointed out
for cases with considerable technology failure showing that
developing a market for marine technologies could be seen as a
hedging strategy against uncertainty in other low-carbon
Table 3
Change in discounted welfare cost in the sensitivity runs compared to the respective reference (without learning and strategic marine investments) (with GD ¼ global
deployment, LR ¼ learning rate, TF ¼ technology failure, SO ¼ learning spill-overs from offshore wind).
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atively insigniﬁcant in scenarios with restricted availability of nu-
clear power or CCS and only occur in combination with high
learning rates for marine technologies. By contrast, cumulated
welfare costs are lowered by up to 4.3% (around £550 billion) in the
scenarios with combined failure in CCS, nuclear power and
renewable electricity options. It's worthwhile noting that although
10% learning rate is enough to induce post-2030 investments in
marine technology with CCS failure (see Table 2), the beneﬁts
gained during the post-2030 period are not enough to balance the
extra costs suffered during the national rollout of the technology.
This remarkable cost difference, which occurs even in the cases
with relatively small learning effects, can be further explained by
looking at the carbon prices across the scenario matrix. In the cases
with full technology availability, themarginal GHG abatement costs
rise from 30 £/t CO2eq in 2020 to 390 £/t CO2eq in 2050. Generally,
carbon prices are relatively stable across the sensitivities in the
learning rate, global deployment and spill-over effects. On the
contrary, the assumptions on technology failure lead to a rise in the
carbon price to up to 810 £/t CO2eq in 2050 (combined case). Here,
the availability of less costly marine energy can signiﬁcantly alle-
viate the cost burden by allowing an increase in electricity gener-
ation and a lower uptake of costlymitigation options in the end-use
sectors leading to a reduction in the carbon price to 660 £/t CO2eq in
2050 in the scenarios with combined technology failure and high
learning.3 Tidal energy is produced from the rotation of the earth relative to the sun and
the moon, resulting in two high water and low water events per day
[66,90,91].Spring tides occur when the moon and sun are in line with each other
which causes the tides to be reinforced. At half-moonweaker tides called neap tides
take place [53].
4 With the exception of spring and neap tides.3.4. Beneﬁts to the electricity system
Other possible beneﬁts from supporting the deployment of tidal
energy, and not fully captured by our UKTM modelling, include the
creation of jobs, new export opportunities, increased regional
development and providing a stable, renewable electricity supply
throughout every hour of the year. As an example, we take the
latter of these possible beneﬁts and assess it further using highRES
[84,85], a model with higher temporal and spatial resolution than
UKTM (more information on the highRES model and methodology
of linking UKTM with highRES can be found in the Supplementary
Material). Like other energy system models UKTM's coarse tem-
poral and spatial resolution does not fully capture variable
renewable energy (VRE) intermittency [76]. As a result it may un-
dervalue the stable and predictable production tidal can provide.
Note that we only study tidal energy as wave energy productioncorrelates with wind energy [53] and therefore provides no similar
balancing beneﬁts as tidal.
Due to the spatial and temporal variability of VREs, high pene-
tration levels could lead to increasingly large disparities between
hourly electricity supply and demand adding system integration
costs. Possible advantages from adding tidal energy to the system
include technological diversiﬁcation, a predictable3 form of
renewable supply and spatial diversiﬁcation of production which
could lead to the supply of renewable ﬁrm power and match a
substantial portion of base load [12,61].4
Of all the UKTM scenarios, the “No CCS scenario” results in the
highest share of VREs in 2050 and is therefore the most appropriate
scenario for studying the system integration beneﬁts that may be
gained from adding tidal energy to the system. UKTM represents
the entire energy system and thus has the advantage of being able
to assess which sectors get electriﬁed andwhat is the resulting total
electricity demand. We use this electricity demand and the port-
folio of non variable renewable energy technology capacities taken
from the UKTM results of the “No CCS scenario” for 2050 and use
them as inputs in the highRES model (see Table 4). We run two
different scenarios:
1. The “REF highRES scenario” for which we use the capacities of
the UKTM ”No CCS reference scenario” (i.e. the scenario that
assumes no marine push). For the purpose of this section of the
paper we use the name “UKTM REF” for the results of the UKTM
“No CCS reference scenario”.
2. The “tidal highRES scenario” for which we use the UKTM sce-
nario “No CCS, 20% learning rate, high global deployment, no
technological spillovers”. As above we use the name “UKTM
tidal” for the results of the “No CCS, 20% learning rate, high
global deployment, no technological spillovers scenario”.
As for UKTM, we assume that the maximum capacity of tidal
energy available for highRES amounts to 24.5 GW. In other words,
highRES is free to invest in as much tidal as it wants up to 24.5 GW.
Table 4
Non VRE capacities and demands taken from UKTM (2050) and used as input in
highRES.




Nuclear capacity (GW) 34.2 34.2
Biomass capacity (GW) 6.8 5.7
Hydropower capacity (GW) 1.64 1.64
Geothermal capacity (GW) 0.5 0.5
Interconnection capacity (GW) 5.8 5.8
Electricity demand (TWh) 570.82 560.42
Fig. 7. Installed capacities of VREs, ﬂexible generation and storage in the UKTM and
highRES references.
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UKTM (i.e. the costs for tidal energy in the “tidal highRES scenario”
include learning).
For both scenarios highRES decides on the cost-optimal
dispatch, VRE generation (including tidal) investments and VRE
integration options investments as well as on the location of all
generation technologies and integration options. VRE integration
options considered are transmission grid extension, electricity
storage and ﬂexible gas turbines. We therefore allow highRES to
not only assess balancing beneﬁts of marine for the portfolio
deﬁned by UKTM, but allow highRES the possibility to suggest a
different VRE portfolio, based on the more detailed spatial and
temporal modelling. We then compare the scenarios and assess
how tidal energy affects the composition of the VRE electricity
system.
Fig. 7 shows that in UKTM tidal energy replaces part of PV
(50%, when compared to the REF scenario), onshore wind (33%)
and offshore wind (5%) capacities, with matching reductions in
production. Following the pattern observed in UKTM, highRES re-
places PV (58%), offshore wind (21%) and onshore wind (8%)
capacities which are all more intermittent than tidal energy. In
terms of VRE integration options, in the UKTM tidal compared to
the UKTM REF scenario the model installs 12% less gas capacity and
48% less storage.5 HighRES doesn't change the ﬂexible generation
capacity across the two scenarios, but installs 13% less storage and
18% less transmission grid extension (due to tidal being placed
closer to demand centres thanwind it replaced were) with the tidal
in the system. In highRES, storage is used the same amount in both
scenarios whereas it generates 27% less from ﬂexible generation,
even when the ﬂexible generation capacity is kept unchanged.
Further, highRES also imports 17% less through interconnection
and produces 21% less from biomass energy (with a capacity5 albeit UKTM installing very little storage compared to highRES: 2.54 vs 23 GW
in the REF highRES scenario.reduction of only about 6%). For comparison, for generation sources
with fuel costs, UKTM generates 10% less electricity from ﬂexible
generation, 5% less from biomass and imports the same amount of
electricity.
Fig. 8 shows the location of VRE and tidal capacities as optimised
by highRES. We see that tidal energy is being placed in the North of
Wales and the South- East, taking advantage of the spatial diver-
siﬁcation and resulting difference in timing of high and low tide. As
UKTM does not have spatial detail, it isn't able to consider such
diversiﬁcation in its optimisation.
We ﬁnd that the general patterns of electricity system design in
UKTM are similar to highRES when tidal energy is introduced to the
system. When looking at the individual technologies, however,
UKTM, contrary to highRES, installs more onshore than offshore
wind, but then in the tidal scenario, again contrary to highRES,
reduces onshore production much more, even below offshore
levels. HighRES, unlike UKTM, is able to optimise the placement of
offshore wind around the UK, taking advantage of good capacity
factors and different timings of production. Onshore wind, in turn,
is only placed in Scotland in highRES, as the capacity factors are
highest there. In the highRES tidal scenario the model chooses to
keep the good onshore locations, as onshore is generally cheaper
than offshore, and reduces offshore wind energy, disproportionally
around Scotland. These spatial diversiﬁcation beneﬁts cannot be
captured with the spatially aggregated UKTM model.
In UKTM tidal energy leads to higher reductions in the inte-
gration capacities needed (ﬂexible generation and storage), but
lower reductions in generation from ﬂexible generation and base-
load than it does in highRES. UKTM does not have the temporal
resolution to adequately represent the intermittency of variable
renewable energy technologies. The variability is represented by a
different availability per time slice,6 making it comparable to dis-
patchable generation but with a poor capacity factor. Due to its
hourly resolution highRES sees the intermittency more accurately
than UKTM and as a result needs the ﬂexible generation and stor-
age for events when renewable energy supply is low and/or de-
mand is high. These events occur less often in the scenario with
tidal energy and tidal energy even replaces some of the baseload
generation.
Overall, we can conclude that UKTM and highRES follow similar
patterns with the introduction of tidal energy. However, due to the
low temporal and spatial resolution of UKTM, it is unable to capture
all the detailed dynamics of the different technologies. highRES is
better suited to study the speciﬁc beneﬁts to the power system
from introducing a stable and predictable renewable energy source.
The lower investments in electricity storage and reduced usage of
ﬂexible generation in highRES allows us to conclude that tidal en-
ergy brings beneﬁts to a low carbon electricity system which may
not be adequately captured by the UKTM modelling framework.3.5. Scope and limitations of the research
We conclude our discussion of the results with a brief note on
some of the key limitations of our research. Firstly, themain tool we
use in our research, UKTM, is a cost-optimizing model with perfect
foresight and thus produces normative, quantitative projections in
absence of any uncertainty, market power or consumer heteroge-
neity. The results therefore need to be understood in this context
and are further conditional to the numerous assumptions that need
to be made when parametrising the model. Secondly, being a cost
focused model, UKTM does not represent well factors other than6 The year is divided into 16 time slices (4 seasons and 4 intra-day time slices).
Fig. 8. Location of VRE and tidal capacities for the tidal highRES and REF highRES scenarios (exact capacities can be found in Table A1).
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regional development concerns or other policy goals, can affect the
deployment of technologies. Thirdly, the overall marine resource
potential is uncertain, can change with future technological de-
velopments and, more generally, the study and most of its results
and insights are speciﬁc to the UK. Fourthly, several simpliﬁcations
are included in the modelling, e.g. we model tidal and wave energy
as one technology, we focus on technology learning in terms of
costs reductions from learning by doing, but do not consider R&D
explicitly or include performance improvements for the learning
(e.g. efﬁciency or lifetime improvements), modelling of technology
spill-overs is limited to those from offshore wind to marine energy
and UKTM, due to its lack of spatial detail, does not account for
spatial cost differences related to e.g. grid connection (highRES
takes into consideration transmission grid reinforcements, but not
on an individual site basis).4. Discussion and conclusions
The UK is currently in a favourable position to develop a national
lead market for marine energy technologies having attractive nat-
ural conditions, experience in other maritime industries, substan-
tial government support and high-quality research facilities.
However, substantial learning effects would be necessary to bring
marine technologies tomaturity and even to a stagewhere they can
compete with other low-carbon technologies.
Against this background, the present analysis has explored, from
a systems perspective, whether strategic national investments into
marine energy technologies in the medium-term and exploiting
the global learning effects that are assumed to be induced by the
early UK action in the long-term would beneﬁt the UK energy
system by contributing to the decarbonisation of the electricity
system. The sensitivity analysis conducted here has allowed us tosystematically assess the impact of key drivers of technology
deployment.
Our analysis highlights the magnitude of the challenges for the
marine energy industry and raises several issues regarding the
beneﬁts of establishing a lead market in the UK:
1) The results of the whole energy systems analysis indicate that
very favourable conditions, i.e. high learning rates and global
deployment, would be required to enable a substantial contri-
bution of marine energy to the UK energy system in the long-
term. Yet, it is highly uncertain that learning rates above 15%
and a globally installed capacity of more than 150 GW by 2050
will indeed materialise.
2) Alternatively, marine energy technologies could be conceived as
a hedging strategy to avoid prohibitive decarbonisation costs in
the case of failure in other key low-carbon options. In light of the
considerable uncertainties regarding the appropriate long-term
decarbonisation pathway, promoting a diverse technology
portfolio has often been highlighted as one of the key strategies
[13,81]. Yet, given the fact that there are alternative technology
options which are closer to cost-competitiveness, it might be
more beneﬁcial and less risky to concentrate policy support on
these options, especially since signiﬁcant cost beneﬁts can only
be gained in case of multiple technology failures. Developing
marine technologies might also provide cost beneﬁts in the case
of CCS not being commercially available, which, given the cur-
rent technology development, does not seem unlikely. The
beneﬁts in terms of system costs calculated in this analysis are,
however, rather low e especially when compared to the addi-
tional costs that developing a marine market in the UK would
induce if no technology failure (or even with a “renewable fail-
ure”) took place.
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scenario analysis indicates that emissions from the UK elec-
tricity system need to be reduced signiﬁcantly by 2030 to stay
on track with the 2050 target e to less than 100 g CO2/kWh
[11,68]. Consequently, a massive roll-out of low-carbon gener-
ation will be required during the 2020s. It is therefore doubtful
whether a technology which is here assumed to reach com-
mercial availability on a global scale only after 2030 will be able
to compete with the already established options.
4) The energy system-wide cost assessment indicates investing in
a national marinemarket generally leads to a slight cost increase
for the energy system (up to £35 billion), with the exemption of
cases with multiple failure in other decarbonisation technolo-
gies. Here, it needs to be stressed that our analysis does not
provide a comprehensive assessment of the economy-wide cost
impacts in terms of GDP or job creation. These effects are very
difﬁcult to estimate, especially those related to export oppor-
tunities [3]. have found positive macroeconomic impacts for
investments in marine capacity in Scotland based on CGE and
input-output modelling exercises, while [44] estimate the
possible contribution of a marine energy market to UK's GDP at
£1.4e4.3 billion by 2050, based on a 15% share in the global
market. Yet, one must not forget that equal or even higher
beneﬁts might be created through the promotion of other in-
dustries. One aspect that has to be highlighted particularly for
the marine energy industry, is its potential to contribute to
regional development of coastal areas that have long beneﬁtted
from the, now declining, offshore oil and gas industry [39].
5) Integrating low-carbon technologies into the existing genera-
tion system will be a major challenge given their often decen-
tralized and intermittent nature [80]. That is why we have also
examined whether a further justiﬁcation for the deployment of
marine technologies could be found in their (renewable)
contribution to system balancing. Our analysis indicates that
including marine technologies has beneﬁts in terms of reduced
VRE integration measures needed to balance the system, espe-
cially when the temporal and spatial detail of the assessment is
increased.
6) Given that it is still in the early stages of development, and
marine energy as such lags behind other low-carbon options,
the UK government would have to be willing to provide sus-
tained, ongoing support for the marine energy industry, at least
until 2030. Apart from the need to drive down costs through
continued research and demonstration projects, support is
required for the development of national supply chains as well
as for upscaling efforts to prove the commercial potential. Such
long timeframes are challenging and recent experience, like the
cancellation of the CCS Commercialisation Competition,
providing £1 billion capital funding [30], puts this prospect in
serious doubt.
7) Lastly, the long-term value for the UK system depends strongly
onwhether marine technologies will take off on a global scale as
national learning effects are unlikely to be sufﬁcient to establish
cost-competitiveness. Both the International Energy Agency
[32] and the International Renewable Energy Agency [34]
highlight the signiﬁcant potential of wave and tidal energy,
but emphasize at the same time the substantial barriers that put
the development at risk. Hence, in terms of long-term export
opportunities and economic beneﬁts, it might be less risky to
concentrate on an already more mature industry where the UK
also has the potential to become a market leader, like offshore
wind energy or CCS.
Thus, on the whole, we conclude that marine energy has the
potential to contribute to the UK energy system, but there is asubstantial risk that the initial strategic investments in a national
lead market will not directly pay off in the long term. Accordingly,
while it may not be time to “pick winners” for the decarbonisation
strategy out to 2050, it might be necessary to “accept losers” at
some point, keeping in mind the value of diversity in the technol-
ogy portfolio on the one hand and the cost of keeping the options
open on the other hand. Furthermore, we would like to emphasize
the need for long-term stable policy support, if the UK is to
establish a central role in any low-carbon technology market. As
one example for an additional beneﬁt from the deployment of
marine technologies we investigate if tidal energy can provide a
stable, renewable electricity supply. Future research analysing
additional beneﬁts such as job creation, new export opportunities,
increased regional development would provide an even more
comprehensive view.
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